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Interview with Simon Prosser
(Conducted on 3rd June 2008. Interviewer: Joe Slater).
Joe Slater: It’s common knowledge among your students that you were originally a physicist.  At 
what point did you “see the light,” as it were, and come to philosophy?
Simon Prosser: Not while I was still doing physics. I often get asked how I started off in physics 
and got into philosophy. It’s not something uncommon, actually. There are quite a few philosophers 
who did either physics or mathematics at  first.  I  think it’s  because in the case of people doing 
physics they’re often interested in the big questions about space and time and the universe and so 
on. Certainly what happened in my case was just that I mis-located the things that I was interested 
in. I thought physicists were the people who addressed the really big questions about those topics, 
and it took a long time to realise that actually what physicists do is mainly mathematics; figuring 
out things that are specific to the actual world. So I did my physics degree feeling that something 
wasn’t right, but I didn’t know what. I even started a Masters degree and had a conditional offer of a 
PhD place before I finally had to accept that physics wasn’t really the thing for me, but I didn’t 
know what I did want to do at that time. I had done just one very short philosophy of science course 
during my physics degree, so I had just a little idea about what philosophy was. It seemed to come 
very naturally to me, but it  took a couple of years after  finishing with physics before I  finally 
decided that I should come and study philosophy properly. Because things hadn’t really worked out 
with the physics I was very cautious about it, so I did a one-year conversion course, a postgraduate 
diploma. I went into it  thinking “well,  just be very careful and see how this goes.” But I very 
quickly realised that I was very, very keen.
J: You’ve been a member of staff here at St Andrews since 2002?
S: That’s right.
J: What attracted you to St Andrews in the first place?
S: Well, to be honest, the job situation in academia generally and certainly in philosophy is such that 
you often don’t have much of a choice, especially at first, so if I’m completely honest what brought 
me here initially was the fact that they offered me a job. Every time a job is advertised loads and 
loads of people apply. But I was very happy to get a job here because it’s an exceptionally strong 
department. In surveys that people respect it’s usually rated in the top two or three departments in 
the UK. And I always wanted to live by the sea. I’m very happy about that too.
J: Are you likely to still be here in a few years time, or are you planning to move on...?
S: No plans to move anywhere at the moment. I think I like the place more and more as time goes 
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on. 
J: At the moment, you’re working on Zeno objects, two dimensional content of consciousness and 
complex demonstratives, indexicals and immunity to error. 
S:  Well,  those  are  some things  I’ve written  about  in  the past.  My main research  interest  is  in 
philosophy  of  mind  and  then  after  that  metaphysics.  After  that  some  areas  of  philosophy  of 
language insofar as they overlap with mind and metaphysics. What I’m going to be working on over 
the next period is a number of issues in philosophy of perception and some things that overlap with 
philosophy of perception and philosophy of time. I’m provisionally planning to write a book on 
time and perception, but before I do that I’ve got a number of articles that I want to finish, mostly 
on issues to do with perception but also some other issues.
J: You regularly make references to other current philosophers in your articles, such as in your 
article about the two-dimensional content of consciousness, you refer to Chalmers, Dretske and Tye. 
To what extent is there a dialogue among philosophers when writing such articles? Do you, for 
example, have David Chalmers’ number in your phone book?
S: I don’t think I have his phone number, but I’ve got his email address! For that particular article 
Chalmers did very kindly read a draft for me. It’s a general  practice that people send drafts of 
articles to people who might be interested or people who might have helpful things to say. Most of 
what gets published has already been read by quite a lot of different people before it even gets sent 
to the journal. It’s very useful because people can point out errors that you don’t see yourself. We 
also meet each other and discuss our work at seminars and conferences. You can’t make anywhere 
near as much progress just working in complete isolation as you do with help from other people.
J: Are there any philosophers today who you particularly agree with?
S: That’s a difficult one. Let’s think...possibly the person I find myself agreeing with most often is 
Daniel Dennett. That doesn’t mean that I agree with everything he says, but I tend to be sympathetic 
to his views. 
J: On a similar note, who would you say has had the greatest philosophical influence on you?
S: That’s a really difficult one. It’s very hard to pick out one person. I suppose when I was writing 
my PhD, Gareth Evans was a big figure and then Dennett... There are probably lots of them. Well, 
Jerry Fodor,  John Perry,  David Kaplan,  Fred Dretske...  There are  probably others that  I’m not 
thinking of. More recently Robert Stalnaker’s work made me rethink a few things. 
J: Is there any advice you would give to any students considering or aiming towards a career in 
philosophy?
S: I’d say they should understand that it’s extremely competitive. But, on the other hand, if you 
really feel that it’s what you want to do, if you’re passionate about it and if you’re willing to make 
sacrifices, then be very stubborn, determined and persistent. You may have lots of setbacks, and it 
can take a lot of determination, but if you’re persistent enough you may get there. Funding for 
graduate studies is very competitive, and there are nowhere near enough jobs to go around and a lot 
of very bright people with PhDs chasing them. And when you get a job you have to work hard and 
it  can  sometimes be stressful.  But  most  of  us  in  this  profession really love  what  we do – I’d 
certainly never want to do anything else.
J: In the current philosophical climate, there appears to be an increasing amount of specialisation. 
No one today can be so successful across the board as Hume, or Kant, or even Russell, so do you 
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think in the future, it will reach the extent, where philosophers have to have very precise niches of 
specialisation or areas of expertise to make any contribution to philosophy?
S: It’s hard to say. I hope it won’t get much more specialised than it is now, because one of the nice 
things about philosophy at the moment is that even though people do specialise there is some scope 
for  doing  something  quite  different.  For  example,  I’ve  toyed  with  the  idea  of  trying  to  write 
something in aesthetics. There are people who maybe work on metaphysics and philosophy of mind 
and then have managed to write something on ethics. It’s certainly not possible to keep up with the 
literature on everything. There’s just too much getting published. But maybe we won’t be able to 
specialise  too  much  more  because  of  the  fact  that  issues  in  philosophy  do  tend  to  be  fairly 
interconnected. Sometimes you have to know a bit about one area to make progress in another area. 
But predicting the future is very difficult.
J: In lectures, you quite often refer to sci-fi series. Star Trek and Red Dwarf spring to mind. It does 
seem  an  interesting  link  between  physics  and  philosophy.  Do  you  think  that  the  sci-fi  genre 
particularly lends itself to being used in examples in philosophy?
S: I think it does. Yes, a lot of philosophers have used thought-experiments that have involved sci-
fi, and in many different areas of philosophy. For example Derek Parfit has used sci-fi examples to 
do with teleportation in certain areas of moral philosophy. I think that sometimes the people who 
write sci-fi  series must have been studying philosophy.  I’m pretty sure that  whoever  wrote  the 
scripts for  Star Trek must know a bit of philosophy because you can sometimes identify specific 
philosophical issues and maybe issues from cognitive science as well. The older series sometimes 
seemed to be influenced by existentialism more than analytic philosophy, although there was one 
episode where they used the liar  paradox to  disarm a robot.  But  yes,  sci-fi  does  lend itself  to 
philosophical examples, I find. It’s all about imagining far-off possibilities and thinking about what 
would happen.
J: What is your favourite sci-fi series?
S: At the moment I’d have to say Battlestar Galactica. Not the old one from the 1970s, but the new 
one.
J: Having experience in both physics and philosophy,  what do you think should be the role of 
philosophy with regard to physics, or science in general?
S: Well, I suppose to clarify what it is that physicists and other scientists do and also to clarify the 
interpretation of their theories. There has tended to be this phenomenon with quantum mechanics in 
particular,  that  physicists  have  given  interpretations  of  quantum  mechanics  that  are  really 
philosophical interpretations. What the physicists can do is figure out the theories and figure out the 
mathematical structure that gives the right predictions, but then, what that really tells us about the 
world is  really a philosophical question.  Philosophy also has other roles,  such as in relation to 
ethical issues that arise from certain scientific investigations or discoveries.
J: I noticed on your webpage that you’re a keen photographer.
S: That’s right. 
J: Do you think that helps out in any way with your philosophising? Does it inspire you?
S: Well, it’s more something I do to give my brain a rest and try to do something more artistic. But I 
have to admit that I am feeling a certain temptation to try to write something on photographic 
aesthetics, because there is a literature of certain issues to do with photography. I haven’t really read 
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very far into it yet, but it’s possible I might try to do something like that at some point. Mostly 
photography satisfies a different need I think. There are some issues of overlap, because I work on 
philosophy of perception quite a lot and sometimes when you’re doing photography it forces you to 
think about how the camera is representing the world. So perhaps it can help a little bit in thinking 
about how the mind is representing the world.
J: One last question. As was asked to Marcus Rossberg in Aporia’s first issue, what is your favourite 
bar in St Andrews.?
S: Favourite bar? There are so many to choose from! (Deliberates for a long time). I suppose it’s 
Drouthy Neebors probably, though I preferred it before they refurbished it, but there are several 
others that I like.
Can Modal Agnosticism Save Constructive 
Empiricism?
Martin Beek
Supervised by Dr. Katherine Hawley
14 May 2007
ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that by adopting modal agnosticism, the constructive empiricist can 
overcome the scientific realist’s main objection. After introducing Bas van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism and showing how he can respond to three traditional objections 
to his view, I consider James Ladyman’s recent critique. Ladyman correctly argues that 
the  constructive  empiricist  needs  to  distinguish  between  the  observable  and 
unobservable in a non-arbitrary manner. To be able to do so, the constructive empiricist 
must recognise objective modality in nature, but doing so would be at odds with the 
position’s  principle  motivation  of  doing  away  with  inflationary  metaphysics  and 
objective  modality.  I  next  explain John Diver’s  modal  agnosticism.  I  argue that  the 
modal agnostic has the resources available for the constructive empiricist to be able to 
make the distinction Ladyman requires.  Since modal  agnosticism does  not  entail  an 
inflationary  metaphysics,  I  argue  that  it  is  compatible  with,  and  can  thus  save, 
constructive empiricism from Ladyman’s challenge.
1. INTRODUCTION
Scientific realists believe that our best, currently accepted scientific theories are approximately true. 
In his seminal work The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen criticises the realist for the ‘inflationary 
metaphysics’ the position entails and offers in its place a constructive empiricist account of science 
which aims to do without the latter. “To be an empiricist” argues van Fraassen, “is to withhold 
belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, observable phenomena, and to recognise no objective 
modality in nature” (1980, 202). 
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